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law.	 Additionally,	 since	 the	 project	 has	 at	 least	 a	 foundational	 codebase,	 the	 project’s	
developers	can	focus	on	the	possibility	of		offering	unique	code	to	the	implementation.	This	
will	 nevertheless	 require	 considerable	 time	 and	 resources	 to	 implement	 and	 sustain.	
Components	to	be	considered	include:	1)	communication	protocol	between	wallets,	2)	wallet	














When	developing	 on	 anonymously	 launched	 chain	 like	 the	 E2	 implementation,	 there	 are,	





about	 responding	 to	 issues.	 Ongoing	 development	 is	 required	 to	 create	 higher	 levels	 of	
security,	improve	network	speed,	implement	transaction	analytics,	and	more.	
	
While	the	E2	implementation	continues	to	propagate	blocks,	a	good	portion	of	development	
on	the	protocol	waned	when	the	project	was	abandoned	by	its	anonymous	creators	in	late	
2018.	If	E2	is	to	grow	into	a	blockchain	that	functions	as	one	way	to	fund	a	portion	of	higher	
education	costs,	then	a	new	team	of	developers	is	needed	to	take	up	the	mantle.	However,	
given	the	very	limited	pool	of	qualified	developers	in	open-source	crypto	noted	by	Electric	
Capital’s	(2019)	report	and	the	thousands	of	cryptocurrency	projects	in	need	of	essential	
work,	the	matter	of	crowdsourcing	developers	to	the	E2		project	is	critical.	This	section,	
therefore,	explores	what	is	needed	to	attract	highly	effective	developers	to	an	open-source	
software	(OSS)	cryptocurrency.	This	section	also	explores	what	attracts	a	wider	community	
of	users	and	funders	(stakeholders)	to	a	cryptocurrency	project.	Our	objective	is	to	
determine	1)	whether	the	E2		implementation	is	an	attractive	cryptocurrency	for	
developers	and	other	stakeholders,	and	2)	what,	if	anything,	we	can	do	to	support,	first,	the	
developer	community	and	then	the	wider	community	around	E2	.	
		
Our	main	contention	is	that	the	nature	of	a	cryptocurrency,	its	opportunities	for	wealth	
generation,	and	its	ability	to	be	a	hedge	against	fiat	are	the	primary	factors	driving	OSS	
projects	and	the	participation	from	developers.	In	addition	to	the	intention	of	the	OSS	
project,	how	the	community	of	stakeholders	enacts	it	mission	is	also	of	the	utmost	
importance.	In	light	of	the	central	banks’	undermining	the	hardness	of	money	on	a	global	
scale,	cryptocurrencies	are	needed,	wanted,	and	worthwhile	in	the	eyes	of	a	sufficiently	
large	group	of	holders.	However,	in	order	to	organically	grow	the	project,	three	
communities	are	required,	which	feed	off	each	other	to	build	long-term	value:	developers,	
users,	and	funders.			
	
The	thesis	that	the	OSS	mission	as	an	enacted	ethos	is	a	central	factor	in	whether	the	
project	can	grow	may	be	connected	to	and	supported	by	the	psychology	that	drives	first	
developers,	then	users,	and	finally	investors	to	latch	on	to	and	contribute	in	their	
respective	ways	to	the	E2	implementation.	It	is	the	same	psychology	as	that	which	enables	
teams	more	generally	to	perform	at	the	highest	levels	–	namely	“emotional	connectedness.”	
Carter	(2018)	showed	that	the	best	performing	teams	in	the	workplace	have	a	high	level	of	
emotional	connectedness.	This	is	brought	on	by	“great	collaboration,	a	positive	vision	of	the	
future,	alignment	of	values,	respect	for	each	other,	and	achieving	killer	outcomes”	(p.	31).	
In	the	context	of	the	E2		implementation,	emotional	connectedness	refers	to	the	degree	to	
which	first	and	primarily	developers,	but	then	also	other	stakeholders,	have	a	feeling	of	
belonging,	a	higher	purpose,	respect	for	each	other,	and	the	ability	to	gain	learning	from	the	
community.			
	
The	psychology	of	emotional	connectedness	is	important	for	understanding	which	
cryptocurrency	projects	will	fail	and	which	will	succeed.	It	is	also	useful	for	informing	the	
strategies	that	we	can	employ	to	encourage	developers	to	take	up	the	E2	mantle,	thereby	
enabling	the	long-term	growth	of	a	wider	and	more	complete	ecosystem	of	stakeholders.	
We	can	think	of	an	open-source	cryptocurrency	and	the	community	of	developers,	users,	
and	funders	surrounding	it	along	the	same	lines	as	an	OSS	project	more	generally.	Both	are	
environments	where	stakeholders	naturally	coalesce	out	of	the	cloud,	so	to	speak.	In	other	
words,	the	open-source	environment,	by	its	nature,	is	very	good	at	self-selecting	for	people	
who	share	the	same	values.	The	origins	and	nature	of	OSS	are	important	for	establishing	
the	structural	reasons	for	this.	In	this	regard,	Midha	and	Palvia	(2012)	provide	a	useful	
“definition”	of	sorts:	“A	typical	open	source	project	starts	when	an	individual	(or	a	group)	
feels	the	need	for	a	new	feature	or	entirely	new	software	and	someone	in	that	group	
eventually	writes	one.	In	order	to	share	it	with	others	who	have	similar	needs,	the	software	
is	released	under	a	license	that	allows	the	community	to	not	only	use	it,	but	to	also	see	the	
source	code	and	modify	it	to	meet	local	needs	and	improve	the	product	by	fixing	bugs”	(p.	
895).	In	other	words,	OSS	starts	with	an	individual	or	small	group	who	identifies	a	need,	
begins	work	on	a	solution,	and	makes	the	solution	freely	available	to	others.	This	is	
supported	by	Schweik	and	English’s	(2012)	research	on	correlations	between	OSS	success	
and	the	early	conditions	of	the	OSS	project,	which	demonstrated	that	open-source	projects	
flourish	when	developers	themselves	are	the	primary	initial	users	of	the	software.		
	
While	OSS	starts	from	identification	of	a	need,	its	long-term	success	can	be	predicted	to	
some	extent	by	whether	the	project	has	vocal	early	proponents.	Schweik	and	English	
(2012)	note	that	“a	relatively	clearly	defined	vision	and	a	mechanism	to	communicate	the	
vision	early	in	the	project's	life"	are	critical	for	OSS	success	(p.	60).	This	is	important	in	our	
context	because	it	tells	us	that	for	E2		to	succeed,	it	needs	proponents	to	clearly	outline	and	
disseminate	the	vision.	The	need	for	dissemination	of	a	clear	vision,	in	turn,	speaks	to	the	
underlying	psychology	behind	what	makes	an	OSS	project	“sticky”	for	the	wider	
community.	This	is	important	because	it	can	help	us	to	craft	the	right	vision.	Note	that	E2	’s	
vision	of	self-funding	for	higher	education	can	be	considered	to	have	a	certain	base-level	of	
worthiness	to	a	large	contingent	of	people.	
	
Since	the	E2	implementation	needs	developers	first	and	foremost	to	take	up	the	mantle,	it	is	
useful	to	consider	the	nature	of	the	OSS	profession	in	order	to	understand	the	underlying	
psychology	of	developers.	We	contend	that	OSS	leads	from	the	start	towards	over-
representation	of	certain	personality	traits.	Without	a	boss	or	any	type	of	traditional		
hierarchy,	developers	in	the	OSS	environment	are	required	to	produce	work	
independently.	Casalnuovo	et.	al	(2015)	and	Middleton	et.	al.	(2019)	showed	that	
successful	OSS	developers	tend	be	those	who	independently	build	something	that	works,	
often	without	pay.	This	leads	to	peer	recognition	and,	finally,	paid	job	offers	from	other	
stakeholders	in	the	wider	ecosystem.	In	the	merit-based,	self-reliant	work	environment	
that	is	OSS,	micro-management,	it	seems,	is	replaced	with	the	motivating	factors	of	
recognition	by	peers	and	independent	financial	return.	Further,	Yoshikawa,	Iwata,	and	
Sawada	(2014),	in	their	study	on	the	importance	of	collaboration	to	the	success	of	OSS,	
found	that	projects	in	which	key	developers	responded	to	pull	requests	and	also	worked	on	
other,	non-related	projects,	had	higher	success	rates.	At	the	developer	level,	therefore,	the	
nature	and	ethos	of	OSS,	again,	maps	closely	to	Carter’s	(2019)	contributing	factors	of	
emotional	connectedness	for	workplace	success.	Regarding	the	E2	implementation,	this	
knowledge	can	be	leveraged	to	inform	strategies	for	fostering	the	organic	growth	of	a	
developer	community.	Where	the	opportunity	exists	to	promote	a	sort	of	“work	culture”	in	
E2	’s	developer	community,	we	therefore	should	encourage	a	merit-based	approach	in	
which	developers	who,	ideally,	work	together	on	other	projects	actively	respond	to	pull	
requests.	
	
The	origin	and	development	of	the	Linux	open-source	operating	system	(OS)	is	a	useful	
example	of	success	in	OSS	in	that	it	demonstrates	all	of	the	above	properties.	It	fits	Midha	
and	Palvia’s	definition	for	how	OSS	starts,	it	is	in	line	Schweik	and	English’s	research	on	
correlations	of	success,	and	it	demonstrates	how	the	underlying	psychology	drives	the	
birth	and	growth	of	open-source	communities.	Linux	as	an	example	is	also	useful	in	that	it	
demonstrates	the	enormous	potential	of	the	OSS	model	to	build	value.		
	
Linux	started	with	a	single	developer,	Linus	Torvald,	who	wanted	an	alternative	to	
Windows.	Torvald	primarily	began	work	on	the	project	because	he	personally	wanted	to	
use	it	(Moody,	2002).	Torvald	was	the	software’s	first	user	and	its	biggest	early	advocate.	
As	with	so	many	inventions	born	of	necessity,	others	quickly	discovered	the	utility	of	
Torvald’s	work.	Many	of	them	started	contributing	to	the	OSS	that	would	become	the	Linux	
OS.	Linux	would	eventually	be	adopted	by	non-developers	(users),	and	before	long,	a	whole	
ecosystem	evolved,	with	enterprises	building	for-profit	products	on	top	of	the	open-source	
code.	Linux	and	the	ecosystem	around	it	are	now,	of	course,	incredibly	valuable,	providing	
the	software	foundation	for	billions	of	Android	devices.	
	
As	we	have	seen,	developers	must	compose	the	first	adherents	to	an	OSS	project.	Without	
them,	there	is	no	project	for	others	to	latch	on	to.	However,	an	OSS	project	must	also	attract	
users	and	funders	if	it	is	to	achieve	long-term	success.	In	this	regard,	the	utility	of	the	
project	is	certainly	important.	However,	particularly	for	cryptocurrency	projects	-	which	
are,	by	definition,	built	on	money	rather	than	software	utility	-	the	emotional	
connectedness	of	the	wider	ecosystem	of	stakeholders	is	arguably	more	important.	For	a	
cryptocurrency	to	succeed,	users	and	funders	must	also	“coalesce	out	of	the	cloud”	and	join	
the	network	so	that	1)	the	value	of	the	network	increases	in	line	with	value	aggregation	
theories	connected	to	Metcalfe’s	law	(for	example	see:	Zhang,	Liu,	&	Xu,	2015),	and	2)	
funding	for	further	development	can	be	secured.	In	this	case,	we	can	say	that	the	emotional	
connectedness	of	adherents	to	a	cryptocurrency	is	driven	by	two	of	Carter’s	factors,	namely	
a	“positive	vision	of	the	future”	and		“alignment	of	values.”		
	
In	the	world	of	cryptocurrencies,	BTC	maps	closely	to	Linux	in	terms	of	its	origins,	organic	
growth,	and	the	value	that	it	ultimately	generates.	However,	the	reasons	for	BTC’s	success,	
it	can	be	argued,	are	also	closely	related	to	the	emotional	connectedness	of	all	its	
adherents,	not	just	early	developers.	The	premise	here	is	that	a	cryptocurrency,	more	than	
pure	software	like	Linux,	is	more	influenced	by	the	emotional	connectedness	of	the	wider	
community.	Further,	this	emotional	connectedness	is	related	to	whether	the	
cryptocurrency	itself	is	considered	truly	“worthwhile”	by	that	community.	BTC	is	a	useful	
example	here	because	of	the	large	number	of	like-minded	individuals	who	have	coalesced	
out	of	the	cloud	to	support	it.	The	BTC	example	is	also	instructive	for	helping	us	understand	
whether		E2		can	ultimately	succeed	and	how	it	should	be	promoted	to	encourage	success.	
Again,	note	that		E2		-	as	an	initiative	for	the	funding	of	higher	education	-	has	a	certain	
base-level	of	worthiness	for	a	significant	contingent	of	people.	
	
BTC	started	when	an	individual	(or,	perhaps,	a	small	group)	known	as	Satoshi	Nakamoto	
wanted	an	alternative	to	fiat	money,	so	he/she/they	built	an	open-source,	decentralized,	
censorship-resistant	protocol	for	money.	The	BTC	white	paper	crystalised	the	vision	of	the	
project	and,	with	Satoshi	as	an	early	advocate,	other	developers	came	onboard	by	
contributing	to	the	codebase	(Champagne,	2014).	Critically,	the	values	of	these	early	
developers	very	closely	aligned	with	the	values	outlined	in	the	white	paper	and	in	
statements	from	BTC’s	key	advocate,	Satoshi.	Early	contributors	largely	fell	into	the	so	
called	“cypherpunk”	mindset,	characterized	by	libertarian	ideals	including	distrust	of	the	
status-quo	financial	system	and	an	emphasis	on	privacy	(Champagne,	2014).	Later,	non-
developers	with	a	similar	ideological	bent,	seeing	the	value	and	aligning	in	beliefs,	latched	
on.	BTC’s	growth,	of	course,	continues	(in	waves)	to	this	day	by	attracting	like-minded	
individuals.	At	this	stage,	it	has	sufficient	power	to	even	influence	the	value	sets	of	some	
newcomers.	The	lesson	here	for		E2		is	that,	in	crystalizing	the	project’s	vision	for	the	public,	
we	should	not	hesitate	to	appeal	to	the	core	values	of	the	people	whom	we	consider	our	
target	adherents,	not	unlike	Satoshi	appealed	to	those	frustrated	with	status-quo	monetary	
policy.	
	
It	can	be	argued	that	BTC,	as	the	first	mover	in	the	world	of	cryptocurrencies,	is	a	special	
case.	Let	us	examine,	therefore,	the	much	newer	cryptocurrency	Grin	as	another	
informative	example	for	determining	the	path	to		E2	’s	success.	Grin’s	niche	in	the	
cryptocurrency	world	is	that,	with	a	focus	on	privacy	and	scalability,	the	project	staunchly	
rejects	the	need	for	an	initial	coin	offering,	pre-mine,	founder’s	reward,	or	block	reward	for	
developers.	In	other	words,	the	project	embraces	the	concept	of	a	“fair	launch.”	For	
development,	Grin	must	therefore	rely	–	like	BTC	–	entirely	on	donations.	Note	that		E2		also	
fits	“fair	launch”	criteria.	
	
The	ability	of	a	cryptocurrency	to	successfully	rely	entirely	on	donations	for	its	
development	is	indicative	of	the	cryptocurrency’s	potential	for	long-term	success.	It	proves,	
in	a	sense,	that	the	vision	of	the	cryptocurrency	is	“worthwhile”	to	a	sufficiently	large	group	
of	people.	In	this	regard,	Grin’s	success	in	receiving	donations	for	development	is	telling.	
Grin	developer	Michael	Cordner’s	story	exemplifies	the	OSS	process,	especially	as	it	relates	
to	funding.	Cordner	started	working	on	the	Grin	protocol	in	May	2017	without	pay	(Hsue,	
2019).	His	contributions	were	judged	by	his	peers,	as	well	as	by	a	growing	network	of	
interested	stakeholders.	After	the	“probationary	period,”	Cordner	had	built	sufficient	social	
capital	to	merit	funding	from	the	community.	Three	funding	campaigns	in	2018	netted	him	
close	to	USD	100,000	in	donations	from	the	Grin	community,	all	before	Grin	was	even	live.	
In	February	2019,	Cordner	launched	another	campaign	to	fund	his	developer	efforts,	
raising	a	further	USD	70,000	within	days.	Throughout	2019,	Grin	has	consistently	garnered	
large	donations	from	its	community,	including	an	anonymous	50	BTC	(approx.	USD	
300,000)	in	May	(Kim,	2019).	
	
The	support	for	developers	that	has	coalesced	from	the	cloud	that	is	the	Grin	community	
starkly	contrasts	with	the	lack	of	support	for	developers	on	the	much	larger	(by	market	cap	
and	brand	recognition)	cryptocurrency	Litecoin.	A	fork	of	BTC	differentiated	by	a	few	
minor	tweaks	to	the	protocol	(namely	block	size,	issuance	rate,	and	total	supply),	Litecoin	
is	a	cryptocurrency	that	is	widely	criticized	as	unnecessary;	its	primary	use-case,	some	
argue,	is	merely	to	operate	as	a	testnet	for	BTC	(which,	incidentally,	has	a	testnet	of	its	
own).	Considering	the	above	discussion	on	the	importance	of	emotional	connectedness	to	
the	success	of	OSS	in	general,	it	should	be	not	surprising,	therefore,	that	there	is	a	lack	of	
robust	support	for	Litecoin	from	its	community	relative	to	that	of	Grin	from	its	community.	
The	Litecoin	Foundation,	which	manages	funding	for	the	cryptocurrency’s	developers,	
overwhelmingly	relies	on	a	single	donor,	Litecoin’s	founder	Charlie	Lee.	Since	2017,	Lee’s	
donations	have	accounted	for	some	80	percent	of	the	foundation’s	funding	(Foxley,	2019).	
Development	on	Litecoin,	in	turn,	seems	to	have	mostly	stopped,	with	nothing	meaningful	
contributed	to	the	codebase	since	October	2018	(Kajpust,	2019).	Contrasting	the	organic	
support	from	the	community	for	Grin	(which	has	a	community	bolstered	by	its	emotional	
connectedness)	with	the	lack	of	organic	support	from	Litecoin’s	community	(which	does	
not)	tells	us	that		E2		-	with	its	worthwhile	goal	of	funding	higher	education	-	is	on	the	right	
track	for	developing	long-term	value	as	a	cryptocurrency.	
	
In	summary,	for	a	cryptocurrency	to	succeed,	it	must,	first	and	foremost,	be	worthwhile	in	
the	eyes	of	a	large	enough	audience.		E2	,	we	argue,	satisfies	that	condition	at	a	base	level,	
but	the	project’s	vision	must	be	made	clear	for	it	to	have	sufficient	power	to	galvanize	early	
adopters,	particularly	developers.	Built	upon	this	solid	foundation,	it	is	possible	for	a	
cryptocurrency	to	reach	critical	mass,	grow	its	community	of	supporters,	and	build	long-
term	value	for	all.	However,	particularly	considering	that		E2		currently	has	no	active	
developers,	work	will	have	to	be	done	to	support	the	project’s	early	developer	community.	
Such	work	should	focus	on	building	the	emotional	connectedness	of	developers	within	the	
confines	of	the	OSS	workplace	environment.	
	
Conclusion,	Limitations,	and	a	Call	for	More	Research		
In	this	work,	the	funding	thesis	proposed	underscores	how	using	open-source	staking	coins	
could	be	one	alternative	to	the	relatively	fixed	way	of	understanding	how	to	fund	higher	
education.	More	specifically,	we	propose	the	E2	implementation	as	a	case	study	for	
examining	the	degree	to	which	a	cryptocurrency	may	generate	capital	for	higher	
education’s	funding	via	dividend	reinvestment	and	network	effects.	The	dividend	
reinvestment	approach	may	afford	for	the	creation	of	a	network	effect,	thus	generating	
significant	capital	for	the	purposes	of	higher	education.		
	
The	research	presented	was	based	on	models	developed	in	2016	and	has	been	amended	
over	the	last	few	years.	However,	the	proposed	model	is	only	one	way	that	wealth	could	be	
generated	in	order	to	fund	higher	education.	Whereas	the	initial	BCC	Crypto	Collaborative		
models	underscored	a	strategy	of	staking	coins,	the	framework	discussed	in	this	paper	has	
the	potential	to	generate	substantial	new	capital	by	crowdsourcing	one	underdeveloped	
chain,	E2.	With	that	point	noted,	PoS	coins	specifically	can	be	deployed	in	such	a	way	that	
other	stakeholders	can	be	invited	into	the	project	to	encourage	its	development	and	
stabilize	the	volatility	of	the	coin	on	exchanges.	Additionally,	in	newer	models	being	
developed,	there	may	be	a	way	that	a	number	of	coins,	akin	to	a	type	of	index	fund,	could	be	
deployed	in	the	interest	of	funding	higher	education,	similar	to	how	the	E2	implementation	
example	functions	in	this	paper.	
	
The	power	of	this	enacted	framework	rests	in	the	notion	that	if	a	number	of	institutions	
collaborate,	or	if	hedge	funds	only	seeking	alpha	joined,	for	example	by	running	their	own	
coin	farms,	the	USD	proceeds	could	be	used	as	the	stakeholders	see	fit.	Since	the	coin	would	
be	on	tradeable	markets,	the	value	of	each	coin	could	grow	significantly.	Higher	value	coins	
could	subsequently	be	rebalanced	into	USD	or	reinvested	into	the	network.	A	collaboration	
such	as	this	is	a	full	departure	from	the	business-as-usual	frameworks	deployed	by	college	
development	offices	and	university	endowment	strategies.		
	
The	wealth-generation	aspects	of	this	proposal	describe	the	redeployment	of	wealth	into	
education.	For	example,	a	well-funded	institution	-	say	any	of	the	top	ten	endowments	
measured	by	USD	-	could	dedicate	its	dividends,	or	portions	thereof,	to	student	
scholarships	or	any	domain	of	funding	consistent	with	its	vision.	Beyond	simply	benefitting	
one	institution,	newly	generated	coins	and/or	new	nodes	could	be	shared.	In	line	with	
network-effect	principles,	the	sharing	of	nodes	increases	the	value	of	the	coins	in	the	entire	
network.	Node	sharing	can	be	seen,	therefore,	not	merely	as	an	egalitarian	endeavor,	
although	it	would	serve	to	address	educational	disparities.	By	contrast,	the	notion	of	an	
institution	sharing	its	dividends	in	USD	remains	unheard	of,	primarily	because	fiat	
currency	has	already	achieved	its	network	effect.	Of	course,	in	a	bear	market,	such	as	the	
one	in	2018	through	the	spring	2019,	network	value	will	not	always	increase	in	terms	of	
fiat.	Nonetheless,	the	dividends	continue	to	grow	in	this	model,	and	the	blockrewards	are	
robust.	Although	network	effect	is	not	the	focus	of	this	work,	in	order	to	gain	a	deeper	
understanding	of	how	Metcalfe’s	(2013)	and	Reed’s	(2001)	social	network	laws	can	be	
applied	specifically	to	the	PoS	environment	and	how	the	phenomenon	of	network	effect	can	
benefit	higher	education	funding,	the	authors	propose	additional	research.		
	
In	this	paper,	we	put	forward	that	the	utilization	of	a	network,	with	the	goal	of	wealth	
generation	via	the	achievement	of	a	network	effect,	for	the	public	good	counterbalances	
any	concerns	about	PoS	coins	within	the	fund,	as	the	social	intelligence	and	reputation	
often	required	to	participate	are	already	achieved	within	the	prototype	itself.	Surely,	
leveraging	a	coin’s	potentially	exclusionary	characteristic	for	the	greater	good	cannot	be	
construed	as	harmful.	We	posit	that	a	network	such	as	the	E2	implementation	may	not	only	
make	higher	education	funding	more	egalitarian	and	accessible,	but	also	may	drive	
innovation	by	granting	researchers	an	independence	and	ability	to	collaborate	rather	than	
compete.	Such	independence	would	benefit	researchers,	their	colleagues,	and	the	public	
good.	Further	research	is	required	in	order	to	understand	the	long-term	viability	of	such	a	
strategy.	For	instance,	models	that	capture	the	wealth-generating	aspects	of	
cryptocurrency	while	mediating	its	volatility	with	safer	assets	should	be	more	fully	
developed.	
	
An	additional	point	of	discussion	is	in	the	call	for	a	next	generation	of	new	research	which	
should	center	on	how	the	hard	money	characteristics	of	some	cryptocurrencies	compare	to	
those	of	gold.	Although	the	point	is	considered	here	briefly,	the	concept	is	worthy	of	
intensive	research.	It	is	worth	noting	that	gold	will	likely	always	be	hard	money	based	on	
chemistry.	Bitcoin,	although	it	is	considered	hard	money,	is	perhaps	more	complicated	in	
that	it	is	reliant	on	social	and	computational	factors	that	emerge	as	a	set	of	risk-factors	
mediating	against	the	asset	class.	Roy	Sebag	(2019)	astutely	addressed	the	hard-money	
aspect	of	both	commodities	in	a	recent	article.	Sebag	addressed	Barry	Silbert’s	Grayscale	
Investments’	‘Drop	Gold’	campaign,	underscoring	that	although	BTC	and	gold	can	both	be	
considered	hard	money,	some	distinctions	urgently	need	to	be	made.	Sebag’s	conception	of	
hard	money	seemingly	contrasts	with	Ammous’s	(2018)	discussion	of	the	same	topic	in	the	
Bitcoin	Standard.	Nonetheless,	the	call	for	additional	research	related	to	money’s	hardness	
is	required,	since,	in	no	small	way,	the	timebound	aspects	of	wealth	generation	as	seen	in	
Lehner	et.	al	(2017)	need	to	be	mediated	against.	
	
In	this	paper,	we	have	focused	on	the	live	blockchain	E2	as	a	potential	implementation	that	
can	fund	higher	education.	As	a	live	blockchain,	the	development	of	E2	must	be	closely	
monitored.	In	addition	to	more	research	and	prototyping,	new	development	tools	such	as	
better	coin	control	tools	and	monitoring	mechanisms	are	required	and/or	need	to	be	made	
publicly	available	on	Github	or	another	developer	forum.	The	authors	are	aware	of	the	
potential	for	fraud,	but	are	optimistic	that	the	type	of	research	and	reconnaissance	done	by	
the	team	in	developing	the	prototype	can	guard	against	it.	Further,	more	stakeholders	-	
including	node	operators,	investors,	and	invariably,	exchanges	-	will	need	to	be	involved.	In	
this	regard,	our	research	shows	that	the	ethos	of	OSS	should	be	embraced.	We	should	
leverage	the	emotional	connectedness	of,	first,	developers	and	then	all	stakeholders	who	
coalesce	out	of	the	cloud	to	support	the	mission	of	funding	higher	education.	To	do	so,	it	is	
essential,	as	a	starting	point,	that	we	crystalize	the	importance	of	our	vision	to	a	sufficiently	
wide	audience.		
	
There	are	many	entities,	including	state	and	federal	governments,	that	can	facilitate,	and	at	
times	hamper,	the	funding	of	higher	education	within	the	United	States	and	globally.	
Multiple	stakeholders,	including	some	financial	interests,	are	involved	in	higher	education’s	
funding,	all	of	which	can	complicate	a	proposal	like	this.	Yet,	historically,	too	few	
opportunities	have	been	presented	that	ease	the	problems	relating	to	the	funding	of	
education.	Nor	have	there	been	successful	proposals	for	ways	to	navigate	beyond	the	
discussion	of	traditional	student	and	institutional	funding	means.	At	this	point,	however,	
cryptocurrency	and	the	technologies	and	social	constructs	supporting	it	may	present	a	
non-traditional	funding	mechanism	that	is	fully	situated	outside	of	government.	While	
clearly	adding	a	layer	of	complexity,	this	mechanism	presents	an	unprecedented	
opportunity	that	is	worth	pursuing.	
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